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vings and Loan A
Frederick T. Furlong*
Over the past several years, savings and loan associations have
diversified their asset portfolios by increasing the share of non-
mortgage investments. New asset powers, along with poor earnings
and deposit deregulation, have providedthe impetus for this change
with its important implications for the survival ofsavings and loans
as effective competitors in financial markets. However, contrary to
the concerns ofsome, savings and loans have not diversified their
portfolios to the detriment ofthe mortgage market.
Savings and loan associations traditionally
have been highly specialized financial institu-
tions. I As they entered the 1980s, they held
over 85 percent of their assets in mortgage
loans and mortgage-backed securities. This
concentration of assets in mortgages stemmed
not only from regulations restricting investment
activities but also from the tax benefits avail-
able to thrifts from holding mortgages. In such
an environment, asset management for savings
and loans primarily entailed using liquid assets
as a buffer against fluctuations in flows to de-
posit accounts subject to interest rate ceilings.
In more recent years, expanded asset powers
have opened new opportunities for thrifts to
invest in nonmortgage assets, while the ex-
tremely poor performance of earnings among
thrifts has diluted the appeal of the tax incen-
tives attached to mortgage lending. In addition,
factors affecting liabilities at savings and loans
have led to changes in the composition of their
assets. As a result, savings and loans have in-
creased substantially the share of their funds
allocated to nonmortgage assets.
The greater use of asset management and the
diversification into nonmortgage activities by
savings and loans is seen by many as necessary
*Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco.
for them to survive in today's interconnected
financial system. However, the apparent re"
duced emphasis on mortgage lending also has
raised some concerns. One ofthese is that more
aggressive pursuit of nonmortgage activities by
savings and loans will curtail the flow of funds
to finance housing.2 This concern is related to
the longstanding belief that the volume of mort-
gage credit is tied to deposit flows at thrifts.
Much ofthe public policy regarding savings and
loans has been founded on this belief, including
the differential on interest rate ceilings which
for many years allowed thrifts to pay a higher
explicit return on deposits than commercial
banks.
This paper provides a perspective on the rea-
sons for the increased asset portfolio diversifi-
cation at savings and loans and the implications
greater diversification may have for the mort-
gage market. The section, "Asset Diversifica-
tion," examines how and why the mix ofsavings
and loan assets has changed during the past sev-
eral years. It argues that, while the easing of
asset restrictions has had some bearing on
changes in asset mix, tax effects and factors af-
fecting liabilities management also have been
instrumental in determining the asset compo-
sition at thrifts. The second section investigates
whether the move to nonmortgage investments
by savings and loans has affected mortgage in-
terest rates and the allocation of funds to mort-
14gages. The findings in that section do not sup-
port the view that the change in asset mix at
savings and loans has had a noticeable impact
on the mortgage market. General comments




Historically, regulations have op-
tions for savings and loans to invest directly in
nonmortgage assets. The regulatory restrictions
have been effectively reinforced by a tax code
that provides strong incentives for thrifts to
hold residential mortgages in the form of loans
and mortgage-backed securities. By holding at
least 60 percent of its assets in specified cate-
gories, a depository institution qualifies as a
thrift and is eligible for special tax benefits.3
Among the "qualifying assets," mortgages are
generally the highest yielding since most of the
other qualifying assets are government obliga-
tions. Once meeting the test of a savings and
loan, an institution can defer taxes on a portion
of its income by placing retained earnings in
special loan loss reserve accounts. 4 The maxi-
mum proportion of income that can be shel-
tered in this way is 40 percent. To protect the
maximum amount ofincome possible, a savings
and loan has to hold at least 82 percent of its
assets in qualifying assets.
These regulatory "restrictions" and tax ben-
efits clearly determined the choice of assets for
savings and loans. Nevertheless, within these
constraints, the asset composition for savings
and loans also has been affected by limitations
they faced in managing liabilities. Having relied
heavily on small-denomination deposits subject
to interest rate ceilings and limited access to
"purchased" funds, savings and loans generally
were not active liability managers. Conse-
quently, asset management at these thrifts con-
sisted mainly of a "passive" adjustment of
short-term asset holdings to absorb swings in
small-denomination deposits.
Through the late 1970s, the interplay of
forces determining the asset composition of
savings and loans resulted in an industry that
held a more or less stable proportion of its as-
sets in mortgages. Over the past several years,
however, the asset mix at savings and loans has
changed dramatically. Combined, mortgages
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and mortgage-backed secuntIes at FSLIC-in-
sured savings institutions fell from 85 1 /2 percent
oftotal assets at the end of 1979 to a little more
than 73 percentin December 1984. As Chart 1
shows, the drop in the ratio of mortgages to
assets at savings and loans was particularly pro-
nounced between mid-1981 and mid-1983.
Asset Restrictions
A natural starting point for explaining this
marked portfolio shift is the change in regula-
tions governing the investment options for sav-
ings and loans. In 1980, the Depository Insti-
tutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act (MCA) broadened asset powers for thrift
institutions, widening their scope to invest in
nonmortgage assets.s Under the Act, federally
chartered savings and loans were permitted to
allocate up to 20 percent of assets to consumer
loans, commercial paper, and other corporate
securities. Federally chartered savings and
loans were allowed to invest in shares of certain
open-end investment companies, to issue credit
Chart 1
Mortgages at FSLlC-lnsured Savings Institutions
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1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984cards, to exercise trust and fiduciary powers
similar to those of nationally chartered com-
mercial banks, and to invest up to 5 percent of
assets in education loans and community de-
velopment and unsecured construction loans.6
For the most part, this set of new asset pow-
ers for savings and loans was adopted to com-
plement the deposit interest rate deregulation
called for in MCA. The decision to phase out
rate ceilings on deposits, rather than to remove
them immediately, was intended mainly to al-
low thrifts time to diversify and to shorten the
effective maturity of their asset portfolios by
using their new powers.
These regulatory changes were necessary
conditions for meaningful asset diversification
for many savings and loans. However, given the
importance ofthe tax incentives associated with
mortgage lending, the regulatory measures
were probably not sufficient conditions. In the
past, the ability to make deferred contributions
to reserves provided a compelling incentive for
savings and loans to hold mortgage-related as-
sets irrespective of other regulations. For ex-
ample, long before MCA, some state-chartered
savings and loans had considerably broader
powers to engage in nonmortgage lending than
their federally chartered counterparts. They did
not exploit this apparent advantage to any real
extent, however, mainly because the tax bene-
fits associated with residential mortgage lend-
ing overwhelmed the gains associated with di-
versifying into nonmortgage assets.
Particularly weak earnings in recent years
have diluted the appeal of the special tax treat-
ment connected with mortgage lending. In the
latter part of 1981 and the first part of 1982,
over three-fourths of the federally insured sav-
ings institutions had negative net income. Itwas
during this period that the most dramatic asset
portfolio adjustments took place. In the last
two years, lower market interest rates have al-
lowed the savings and loan industry as a whole
to post positive net earnings. Nevertheless, by
mid-1984, the proportion of savings institutions
insured by the Federal Savings and Loan In-
surance Corporation posting losses still was
about one out of four.
With both the regulatory and tax constraints
to asset diversification relaxed, it is not sur-
TABLE 1
Portfolio Changes at FSLlC-lnsured Savings Institutions
Percent of assets as of December
Change in share of assets
from 1979 to 1984
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 (percentage points)
Assets
Mortgages and mortgage-
backed securities 85.4 84.0 82.8 77.5 75.2 73.3
Cash and securities 8.9 9.8 10.1 12.0 13.4 13.3
Consumer and commercial
loans 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.9 3.4 4.5
Other assets 2.9 3.2 4.3 7.6 8.0 8.9
~------~,~ -' ,""--",~,~,-------.-,~,"~--~-"-~"",,,,~_._-----
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1 Include large-denomination CDs, Federal Home Loan Bank advances and other borrowed
funds.
16prising that we saw a change in the asset com-
position of savings and loans. Indeed, from
Chart 1, it might appear that the easing of"con-
straints" on assets was the dominant influence
on the portfolio changes. However, further
ancllvS1S suggests a somewhat more temperate
assessment of the importance of the change in
asset powers and the decline in earnings.
First, only a small portion of the drop in the
ratio of mortgages to assets at savings and loans
was related to an increase in nonmortgage
loans. From 1979 to December 1984, consumer
and commercial loans accounted for only 1.7
percentage points of the 12.1 percentage rise in
the ratio of nonmortgage assets to total assets
at FSLICinsured institutions (Table 1).7 More-
over, the ratio of consumer and commercial
loans to total assets was virtually unchanged
from 1979 to 1982; it rose in 1983 and 1984 after
most of the adjustment in the ratio of mort-
gages to assets had already taken place.
;J1J'~"'l'C" factors also account for much of the
change in "other assets" shown in Table 1. For
example, induded in "other assets" is "goodwill
and other tangible assets." The value of this
asset category was boosted considerably
through the purchase accounting procedures
used in savings and loan mergers. About 2.3
percentage points of the rise in "other assets"
as a share of total assets from 1979 to 1984 can
be attributed to the rise of goodwill alone. Of
the remaining 3.7 percentage points rise in the
ratio of "other assets," about one-third can be
explained by the increase in FSLIC-insured in-
stitutions' equity investments in their service
corporations, something they were allowed to
do before MCA.s
Increased liquidity
The growth in "cash and securities" over the
past several years also indicates that the relax-
ation of asset restrictions was not the only in-
fluence on the asset mix at thrifts. The bulk of
these assets are federal government or federally
sponsored agency securities, bank CDs and fed-
eral funds, which savings and loans were em-
powered to hold even before MCA. And, as
mentioned earlier, some of these securities can
17
be used by thrifts to qualify for special tax
treatment.
The increase in the relative holdings of "cash
and securities" could reflect factors affecting
small-denomination deposits at thrift institu-
tions. A possible connection
in cash and securities were accumulated in the
face of deposit-rate deregulation which stimu-
lated strong small-denomination deposit flows.
Such a response by savings and loans would be
in keeping with their traditional passive ap-
proach to managing liquid assets.
In this context, the quantity of these so-called
"core deposits," which represent the main
source of funding for savings and loans, is dif-
ficult to control in the short-run. With limited
use of managed liabilities (which include Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank advances, large-denom-
ination CDs, RPs, and mortgage-backed
bonds), most savings and loans have relied to
a large extent on liquid assets, such as those
included in cash and securities, as a buffer for
variations in small-denomination deposit flows.
Under this passive asset and liability manage-
ment arrangement, there tends to be a positive
correlation between changes in liquid asset
holdings and core deposit flows at savings and
loans.
This characterization of savings and loan
management of liquid assets would seem to be
particularly appropriate in the post-1982 pe-
riod. Chart 2 shows that with the onset of full
deposit deregulation-the introduction of the
ceiling-free money market deposit account
(MMDA) in late 1982-flows of deposit ex-
cluding large CDs surged in early 1983 and re-
mained relatively strong through 1984.9
Savings and loans responded to a flood of
core deposits in early 1983 by building up their
holdings ofcash and securities. In fact, virtually
all of the rise in the ratio of cash and securities
to total assets in 1983 (shown in Table 1) oc-
curred in the first half of the year. 10 After mid-
1983, that ratio varied some from quarter to
quarter, but on balance did not change much
through the end of 1984.
The changes in managed liabilities at savings
and loans in early 1983 mirrored that of liquid
assets. Following the introduction of theConclusion
The decline in the relative importance of
mortgages at savings and loans in recent years
has been the result ofseveral factors in addition
to the provisions of the MCA. These include
the methods used by regulators to manage thrift
crises, increased equity investments in thrifts'
service corporations, and a dramatically
changed financial environment.
thrifts over that for commercial banks was re-
moved whenever the six-month Treasury bill
rate was 9 percent or higher. The impact of the
loss of the differential on the popular MMC is
illustrated in Chart 2. The purple line shows
that, after the loss of the differential on the
MMC, savings and loans and other thrifts lost
ground to commercial banks during the phase-
out of deposit ceilings. Thrifts' share of total
deposits fell more or less steadily between mid-
1979 and the end of 1982, and the drop was
reflected in generally weak core deposit flows.
On balance then, the deregulation of deposit
interest rate ceilings, with its impact on flows
to core deposits, probably contributed to the
rise in the holdings of cash and securities at
savings and loans. However, the observation
that reliance on both liquid assets and managed
liabilities has increased, suggests that the in-
crease in liquid assets at savings and loans prob-
ably reflected a higher demand of thrifts for
liquidity rather than only strong flows of small-
denomination deposits.
During the phase-out of deposit interest rate
ceilings, which was marked by the loss of the
bank/thrift differential on the popular MMC as
well as high and variable market interest rates,
the increased demand for liquid assets probably
was due to a deterioration in the outlook for
the stability and the overall availability of
small-denomination deposit balances at savings
and loans. The persistence of a relatively high
ratio ofcash and securities to total assets more
recently may have two causes: a continued de-
mand for liquidity in the face of the shortening
overall maturity of core deposits that has ac-
companied deposit deregulation, and/or the
greater amount of intermediation carried out















MMDA, savings and loans ran off a consider-
able volume of managed liabilities. This is re-
flected in Table 1 as a decline in the ratio of
liabilities to total assets for 1983.
Ho,we~ver. the upward trend in savings and loan
reliance on managed liabilities before 1983,
which continued in 1984, suggests that thrifts
may not have been reacting only to strong core
deposit flows over the past several years. In-
Chart 2 indicates that, from 1979 through
the growth ofcore deposits was relatively
weak despite the introduction of market-rate
deposit accounts.
One reason that core deposits did not per-
form "better" prior to 1983 is that, during the
phase-out of deposit ceilings, deregulation rep-
resented a two-edged sword for savings and
loans. The six-month money market certificate
(MMC), for example, allowed thrifts to com-
pete more effectively with issuers of nondeposit
instruments and dampened for a while the im-
pact of higher market interest rates on flows to
thrifts. (This account was introduced in mid-
1978 and had a variable-ceiling indexed to the
six-month Treasury bill rate.) However, with
the other edge of the sword, the effectiveness
of the MMC as an instrument for thrifts to com-
pete against commercial banks was reduced
considerably in March 1979. At that time, the












18In the future, some savings institutions prob-
ably will further diversify given the virtually un-
limited scope of activities now open to them.
They will be able to compete on a broader basis
in financial markets, and will prclbablv
hold relatively more assets.
however, earnings should ;tnnrr"rp
provement should reduce the Impetus to move
away from mortgage assets.
II. Implications for the Mortgage
This section examines the implications that
the changes in savings and loan asset compo-
sition have for the mortgage market. The prop-
osition that a link exists between the asset mix
ofsavings and loans and the allocation ofcredit
to housing is a variant of the one that ties the
volume of mortgage credit to deposit growth at
thrifts. Presumably, in the latter case, for a
given volume of total credit, the larger the
share of the funds channeled through thrifts,
the higher the proportion of credit allocated to
mortgages. If this were true, it follows that if
thrifts reduce their propensity to invest in mort-
gage-related assets, then, all else equal, a
smaller fraction of credit will go to mortgages
and mortgage rates will rise relative to other
market rates.
For deposit flows at thrifts and their mix of
assets to have an impact on the allocation of
credit to the mortgage market requires not only
some separation of the mortgage market from
the rest of the capital market, but also some
segmentation within the mortgage market it-
self. That is, changes in mortgage lending by
savings and loans, owing to developments spe-
cific to those institutions, must not be offset by
other lenders.
Some degree of separation in financial mar-
kets might be expected in the short-run if in-
stitutional arrangements for channeling funds
in the credit market are costly to adjust and the
market disruptions are viewed as only tempo-
rary. However, it seems reasonable to expect
that a permanent change in the propensity of
thrifts to extend mortgage loans would induce
adjustments by other lenders. This is particu-
larly true given the increased importance of
mortgaged-backed securities. In evaluating the
impact of deposit interest rate ceilings, King
(1979) suggests that regulation ofthrifts is likely
to affect the channels for mortgage credit rather
19
than the volume of such credit. This holds as
well for regulations affecting the cOlmp'OSJlticm
of assets at savings and loans.
The plausibility of the that
participants in the capital market would
is only one reason that a changing asset
thrifts should not affect the allocation of credit.
The idea that the asset mix at thrifts affects
housing credit also is based on the qu,cs!ronablc
presumption that thrifts substitute non-
mortgage assets for mortgages. This presump-
tion ignores the fact that asset
should be related to liability and
the deregulation of which to~~etl1er
feet the overall flow of funds to and
loans.
In the previous section, it was out
that deposit deregulation contributed to the re-
bound of savings institutions as intermediaries.
This has been evident
couple of years, during which the
formance of savings and loans was tied the
re-intermediation of small-denomination de-
posits foliowing the lifting of del)OSllt C(;:lllng:s.
The removal of deposit lowered the
overall cost of deposits, intermediation
more efficient. To the extent that funds ac-
quired by thrifts had been allocated to non-
mortgage uses, such as in commercial paper
held by money market mutual the in-
vestment of those funds thrifts in similar in-
struments would have no on the allo-
cation of credit.
In addition, as discussed
tion carried out by savings and loans in recent
years has been boosted their re-
liance on large-denomination and
other nondeposit funds. This has been
ularly true in the past of years. After
initial surge in small-denomination aeposlt
growth following the introduction of JVlJHL/I~.,.In equation 1, R is the actual mortgage rate,
R* is the equilibrium mortgage rate, and X.
measures the speed at which the mortgage rate
adjusts to its equilibrium value. The equilib-
rium mortgage rate is assumed to be deter-
mined by the marginal cost of funds at savings
institutions (C). 13 For the purpose of this paper,
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assets) stabilized between mid-1983 and the
third quarter of 1984, the ratios of total mort-
gages to the volume of aggregate private bor-
rowing fell. The two ratios did decline in the
last quarter of 1984. However, on balance, it
does not appear that there has been a consistent
positive (or negative) relation between changes
in the relative allocation of funds to mortgages
by savings institutions and the share of aggre-
gate borrowing accounted for by mortgages.
Another way of investigating the impact of
the change in the asset mix at savings institu-
tions on the mortgage market is to examine the
behavior of mortgage interest rates. In keeping
with several past studies on the determination
of mortgage interest rates (see for example Jaf-
fee and Rosen, 1979; Pyle, 1982; Anoako-Ada
and Ben-Zion, 1983), it is assumed that mort-
gage rates can be modeled as a partial adjust-
ment process such that,
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FSLIC-insured savings institutions once again
picked up their issuance of managed liabilities.
Some institutions have been particularly ag-
gressive in issuing large CDs, apparently as part
of a strategy to use liability management to in-
crease asset growth. 12
As a result of stronger managed liabilities,
savings and loans have been able to extend a
large volume of mortgage credit and simulta-
neously increase their relative holdings of non-
mortgage assets. In 1984, for example, their
mortgage holdings increased by about 15 1 /2 per-
cent and total assets expanded by almost 20 per-
cent. Thus, since the changing mix ofassets was
accompanied by rapid growth in assets, the
nonmortgage activity at thrifts has comple-
mented, rather than substituted for, mortgage
lending.
Chart 3 provides evidence that is consistent
with the view that changes in the mix of assets
at FSLIC-insured savings institutions have not
affected the allocation of funds to mortgages.
The purple line in the chart represents the
quarterly change in mortgages at FSLIC-in-
sured institutions as a percent of the change in
their assets, while the black line shows total
mortgages flows-that is, net extensions of
mortgages by all lenders, including house-
holds-as a share of private domestic nonfi-
nancial borrowing.
The shaded region in the chart sets off the
period in which the shift to nonmortgage assets
at savings and loans was most pronounced.
During that period, the ratios of mortgages to
private domestic nonfinancial borrowing varied
but, on balance, tended to rise, not fall. The
movement of the ratio of total mortgage lend-
ing to private borrowing in the early 1980s ap-
pears to reflect changes in interest rates rather
than portfolio adjustments at savings institu-
tions. The peak in the 1980 credit control pe-
riod aside, the ratio of mortgages to private
borrowing fell in late 1980 and early 1981 as
market interest rates rose. The ratio remained
low, relative to the late 1970s, until the second
half of 1982 when market rates began falling
sharply.
As net mortgage flows at FSLIC-insured in-
stitutions (measured as a share of the change in
20To test whether changes in the composition
of assets at savings and loans affect the rate on
mortgages, the share of the flow of funds at
FSLIC-insured savings institutions allocated to
mortgages (M) is included as a determinant of
the equilibrium mortgage rate. Also,·to allow
for the possibility that the flow of funds to sav-
ings and loans has repercussions on the mort-
gage rate,the equilibrium mortgage rate is ex-
pressed as a function of the percent change in
small-denomination deposits at savings and
loans (D).14
With these assumptions, the change in the
mortgage rate can be expressed as a linear
function:
Rt - Rt - I = (2)
A[ao + alCt+ a2Mt + a3Dt - Rt d
This can be restated in the standard regression
form:
Rt = 130 + f3lCt + f32Mt (3)
+ f33Dt+ f34Rt I + £t
Based on portfolio theory, the use of simple
regression analysis and equation 3 to investi-
gate the relation between the mortgage rate and
the asset mix at savings and loans may be un-
satisfactory. Within a simple portfolio model,
the fraction of funds allocated to mortgages by
savings and loans would be expected to be pos-
itively related to the spread between the mort-
gage rate and the marginal cost of funds. This
positive relation is just the opposite of what
would be predicted under the "supply shock"
hypothesis being tested in equation 3. Under
that hypothesis, a greater allocation offunds to
mortgages would tend to narrow the spread be-
tween the mortgage rate and the marginal cost
of funds.
If both of these channels of influence come
into play (the mortgage rate being affected by
the flow offunds at savings and loans allocated
to mortgages and vice versa), a single equation
approach to estimating equation 3 would gen-
erate a biased estimate of 132' Accordingly, a
two-stage estimation approach is used. In the
first stage, an instrumental variable is derived
for M. 15 The second stage involves an ordinary
least squares estimation of equation 3 in which
the instrumental variable values for Mare
included.
The estimation results for equation 3 (with
the instrumental variables included) are re-
ported in Table 2. 16 Equation I in the table is
estimated using the commitment rate on mort-
gages from a survey conducted by the U.S. De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD). In that equation, the estimated coef-
ficient for M is not significantly different from
zero. This result does not support the hypoth-
TABLE 2





Constant Ct Dt Rt - 1
-2
SE OW Mt R p
I. HUD 1.26 0.57 -0.11 0.10 0.45 0.87 0.66 1.95 0.32
Commitment (3.90)* (-0.14) (-1.37) (3.23)* (-1.60)
Rate
II. GNMA Rate 1.63 0.88 -0.06 -0.04 0.08 0.99 0.23 1.92 0.79
(15.05)* (-0.13) (- t.48) (0.99) (6.54)*
t-statistics in parentheses.
*Significantly different from zero at the one percent level.
21esis that m the asset mIX at FSLIC-
insured institutions have had any significant
contt~mporarle()Usimpact on the primary mort-
gage market interest rate in recent years. The
fm'dlllgs are confirmed when equation 3 is es-
values of M instead of
the values of the instrumental variable. 17
The results for I in Table 2 also
the estimated coefficient for D is not
statistically different from zero at the conven-
tional levels of significance, although the t-sta-
tistic for the coefficient for D is larger than that
M. This suggests that, in the pri-
mary market, the growth rate of
small-denomination deposits at savings institu-
tions has not had an impact on mortgage rates
in recent years. Jaffee and Rosen (1979), in
contrast, showed that the ratio of the change in
the level of and loan deposits to the
value of new single-family homes had a nega-
tive and significant relation to in-
terest rates in the mortgage market
to 1979. The evidence in Table 2 is con-
sistent with the view that financial markets have
become more over time. 19
EquatIOn II in Table 2 tests for the impact of
"".lnl..l" shocks" at savings institutions on inter-
est rates in the mortgage market us-
ing the rate on GNMA securities as the depend-
ent variable. The findings in equation II
indicate that the secondary mortgage market
rate is not influenced by changes in the asset
mix or the flow of funds at savings institutions.
One difference between the estimates for equa-
tions I and II is the more rapid adjustment of
the secondary mortgage market rate. This, of
course, is consistent with the secondary market
being more fully integrated with the rest of the
capital market.
From a theoretical perspective, in the long-
run, adjustments within the capital market
would be expected to eliminate any potential
for an impact on the mortgage market stem-
ming from a permanent change in the propens-
ity of savings institutions to channel funds to
mortgage borrowers. Even in the short-run, to
the extent that asset restructuring by thrifts
came about as a result of an increase in the level
of intermediation at these institutions, the al-
location offunds to the mortgage market would
not be affected. Indeed, the empirical evidence
is consistent with the view that the shift by sav-
ings institutions to holding a greater share of
their assets in nonmortgage assets has not had
an effect on mortgage rates or the allocation of
funds to the mortgage market.
III. Conclusion
tors in financial markets. They also will change
the operation of the mortgage market. For ex-
ample, there is an ever-growing tendency to-
ward the use of mortgage-backed securities.
Greater diversification does not, however, ap-
pear to have significantly altered the flow of
funds to the mortgage market or the relation
between mortgage rates and other market
rates. In part, the greater interconnection of
deposit and mortgage markets with money and
capital markets probably has muted any poten-
tial impact stemming frem asset changes at
thrifts. Also, given the exceptionally rapid
growth of savings and loan assets in the past
two years, it is likely that the nonmortgage ac-
tivityat savings and loans has been a comple-
ment to, rather than a substitute for, their tra-
ditional mortgage lending.
themselves.
The initiatives taken by savings and loans to
balance their portfolios have important impli-
cations for their survival as effective competi-
In recent years, savings and loans have been
allowed to venture to a greater extent into non-
rnr,rt'T'H'0 activities. Since 1980, their new pow-
,""uunnu,""u with poor earnings have encour-
diversification in their asset
portfolios, thereby decreasing the relative role
of mortgage-related assets in their portfolios.
the relaxing of asset restrictions does
not appear to be the only stimulus to thrifts
Se(;kIng arr,,,t,'r diversification. Changes affect-
liabilities likely also have influenced the
cOlnposItlon of and loan assets. In the
ear'nillgs improve, the tax incentives
have made mortgage lending
attractive to thrifts will reassert
22FOOTNOTES
1. Throughout the paper, the term "savings and loan as-
sociations" refers to all savings institutions insured by the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLlC),
which includes both savings and loans and certain savings
banks.
2. At another level, there is the worry that increased non-
mortgage investments would expose the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation to greater risk. There also
is concern that, if savings and loans were to shed their
traditional role as mortgage l/:lnders, they would be subject
to the sarne regulations that apply to banks and bank hold-
ing companies. Such regulations generally are more strin-
gent than those forthrifts and.. their holding companiE3s.
3. See Guide to Federal Income Taxes for Savings
Institutions.
4. Depository institutions that do not meet the thrift test
can make tax-sheltered contributions to loan loss reserves
that are based on actual losses incurred in the past.
5. The Garn-St Germain Act of 1982 also provides for
some additional mortgage powers. For a description, see
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Leveling the Playing
Field, A Review of the OIDMCA of 1980 and the Gam-St
Germain Act of 1982.
6. For a discussion of these powers and those given to
federally chartered savings banks under MCA, see Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago, Ibid.
7. The behavior of savings banks not insured by the FSLlC
has been different from that of the FSLlC-insured savings
institutions. The former markedly increased the proportion
of assets held in nonmortgage loans (see Mahoney, Patrick
I. and Alice P. White. "The Thrift Industry in Transition."
Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1985, pp. 137-156).
8. Savings and loans also can engage in nonmortgage
activities through service corporations. The activities of
such subsidiaries are not reflected in the data shown in
Table 1.
9. In addition to the lifting of deposit ceilings, the sharp
drop in interest rates in the second half of 1982 likely was
a crucial factor in the revival of thrift deposit flows.
10. For a discussion of the changes in assets and liabilities
at thrift institutions and commercial banks brought on by
the introduction of the money market deposit account, see
Furlong (1983).
11. The highly liquid MMDA, which by far is the most pop-
ular of the deregulated deposit accounts, allows up to six
automatic transfers per month (up to three of these by
check) and an unlimited number of withdrawals when they
are made in person. The overall maturity of deposits at
savings and loans also has been shortened as a result of
the introduction of nationwide NOW accounts in 1981.
NOW accounts are fully transactional.
12. Keeley (1984) points out that deposit deregulation af-
fected the liability structure of commercial banks by caus-
ing the substitution of smaller-denomination deposits for
large certificates of deposits. For savings and loans, de-
regulation may have reduced their comparative advantage
in attracting small-denomination deposits. This lost com-
parative advantage may account for some of their in-
creased reliance on large CDs.
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13. A number of studies have examined the issue of
whether mortgage interest rates are determined by mar-
ginal cost or average cost: Jaffee and Rosen, 1979; Pyle,
1982; Anoako-Adu and Ben-Zion, 1983; and Mayer and
Nathan; 1983. There.is· little dispute over the fact thi'lt,. on
theoretical grounds, marginal cost pricing is the preferable
approach for modeling the behavor of financial institutions.
However, the empirical evidence is mixed. The average
cost of funds (or deposits) at mortgage lending institutions
has. b/:len found to be significant in explaining mortgage
interest rates when some measures of the marginal cost
of funds, but not others, are used in mortgage rate regres-
sions. Nevertheless, on balance, the emprical evid/:lncein-
dicates that,of the two depictions of behavior, marginal
cost pricing is more appropriate.
14. Since the testis whether exogenous shocks to the flow
of funds at savings and loans affect the mortgage rate, it
is more appropriate to use the small-denomination deposits
than some broader measure of liabilities over which these
thrifts have greater control.
15. The instrumental variable for M is derived from an
equation with the marginal cost of funds, the lagged mort-
gage rate, the return on assets at FSLlC-insured institu-
tions, the lagged ratio of the stock of mortgages to assets
at FSLlC-insured institutions, and the percent change in
total financial assets included as the right-hand-side vari-
ables. The adjusted R2 for this estimated equation was
0.77.
16. To control for the possible effects of the 1980 credit
control period on the constant term, equation 3 also was
estimated using a bivariate (0,1) dummy for the 1980:2 to
1980:3 period. The coefficient for this variable was not sig-
nificantly different from zero, and the variable was not in-
cluded in the estimations reported in Table 2.
17. Based on the discussion in Section I, the composition
of savings and loan assets would tend to be tied to core
deposit flows. Given the potential for the interrelation be-
tween asset and liability management to affect the statis-
tical findings regarding the relation of M to the mortgage
rate, equation 3 was estimated with the variable D ex-
cluded. However, the estimated coefficient for M still was
not significantly different from zero when either the actual
or the instrumental values for M were used in the
estimation.
18. In keeping with the comment in the previous footnote,
equation 3 was estimated with the variable M excluded.
The findings regarding the impact of D on the mortgage
rate were not materially changed.
It is also possible that savings and loans do attempt to
manage small-denomination deposits to some degree.
Consequently, the growth rate of small-denomination de-
posits may be affected by the mortgage rate given the
opportunity cost. For example, if mortgage rates for some
reason were high relative to other market rates, savings
and loans might attempt to attract a larger volume of small-
denomination deposits. If this were the case, 0 would not
be independent of the error term in equation 3. Accordingly,
equation 3 was estimated using an instrumental variable
approach similar to that used for M. In this case, the coef-
ficient for D once again was not significantly different from
zero.19. The conclusions regarding the relation between mort-
gage rates and small-denomination deposit flows at sav-
ings and loans have to be tempered some, based on evi-
dence not shown in Table 2. A series on commitment rates
at savings and loans is available from the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). This series was not used in
Table 2 because the FHLBB used interest rates on both
fixed and variable-rate mortgages through September
1983. The HUD series is based on data for fixed-rate loans.
When equation 3 is estimated using the FHLBB series, the
results concerning the relation between Rand M are es-
sentially the same as those reported using the HUD series.
However, when either the actual or the instrumental vari-
able values for M and D are used, the growth rate in small-
denomination deposits has a small negative impact on the
mortgage rate, and the effect is statistically significant. The
problem is that it is unclear to what extent the mixing of
variable- and fixed-rate yields accounts for these results.
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